Chapter 156: The Flames of War in Europe

On November 21, following the direct personal intervention of Derfflinger, Ludendorff’s strategy was officially implemented.

The following day, the German army launched a general offensive against the encircled British Expeditionary Force. To annihilate the British Expeditionary Force in a single stroke, the German forces deployed two hundred and twenty divisions, utilizing nearly one hundred thousand artillery pieces and mortars, with over twenty thousand of them being heavy guns of 120mm caliber or larger.

The battle raged continuously until the final day of November.

Having suffered over three hundred thousand casualties and expended tens of millions of shells, the German army compelled Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, to sign the instrument of surrender on November 30. They also forced the remaining one million eight hundred thousand British officers and soldiers to lay down their arms and cease all resistance.

The surrender of the British Expeditionary Force was both within and beyond everyone's expectations.

Having reached this juncture, with no means of retreating to the home islands, the sole remaining option for the British Expeditionary Force was surrender. Otherwise, the remaining million-plus officers and men would all die in combat—and die a meaningless death under conditions of severe shortages in food and ammunition, utterly incapable of fighting the German army.

Yet, the fact that the British Expeditionary Force surrendered so swiftly was indeed somewhat astonishing.

One must bear in mind that a force of over two million men was completely crushed by the German army in less than ten days, with even Haig being taken prisoner by the Germans.

The surrender of the British Expeditionary Force was tantamount to issuing an ultimatum to France.

By this point, anyone could foresee that once the German forces regrouped and redeployed, their next target would be Paris. Furthermore, across the three routes advancing toward Paris, the French army lacked sufficient troops. It could even be said that the gates of Paris were wide open, and for the German army, capturing Paris would be as easy as taking something from a pocket.

In truth, this also constituted the greatest internal conflict within the German command.

The majority of generals advocated for an immediate advance on Paris, aiming to capture the city before the French forces could recover their breath. Meanwhile, Ludendorff, Hoffmann, and others argued that the German troops, who had already been engaged in bitter combat for a month, should be granted a respite. They believed sufficient time ought to be allocated to make proper preparations for the assault on Paris, contending that launching the offensive in mid-December would still allow them to capture the capital before the year's end. However, on this occasion, the German Emperor clearly disagreed with postponing the attack on Paris to mid-December, as this meant the German army would have only a little over ten days. Judging by previous campaigns, capturing Paris required at least a month.

Clearly, the Kaiser had overestimated the combat effectiveness of the French army.

Under the Kaiser's urging, Ludendorff scheduled the assault on Paris for December 5, leaving the German army with merely five days to conduct operational deployments and adjustments.

For a large-scale campaign, five days of preparation time appeared far too hasty.

One must realize that merely transporting the combat supplies required by millions of German soldiers from the rear to the front lines and distributing them to individual combat units would normally take over a month. Even with the supplies stockpiled by the German forces at the front not yet exhausted, adjusting the deployment of more than three hundred divisions still required over ten days.

With only five days at his disposal, Ludendorff could only make limited adjustments.

Consequently, a large number of divisions that had suffered severe attrition in previous battles were not withdrawn; instead, they were merely replenished with personnel drawn from reserves. Conversely, numerous divisions with ample manpower and in prime condition could not be sent to the front lines and were forced to remain in the rear serving as reserves.

Fortunately, the situation of the French army was even more dire.

Along the Somme and at Verdun, the French army had already paid the heavy price of nearly two million casualties and prisoners, leaving them with virtually no reserves to dispatch. At that time, Marshal Pétain, responsible for the defense of the Somme, even began conscripting sixteen-year-old boys into service to replenish the French ranks.

On December 6, amidst bitter cold, the German army began its advance toward Paris.

During the first two days, the progress of the German forces was far from smooth. This was not due to stubborn French resistance, but rather the atrocious weather, as the freezing cold and relentless heavy rain severely hampered the German pace.

It was not until December 9, after the rain ceased, that the German offensive began to show momentum.

The adverse weather also exerted a severe impact on the French forces. Most prominently, the French army failed to adjust its defensive deployments in a timely manner. The reserves left in the rear were unable to advance promptly, nor could they reach the German breakthrough points in time to plug the ruptured defensive lines.

On December 12, the German vanguard reached the outskirts of Paris, with reconnaissance troops even approaching the city limits.

On that very day, Foch departed Paris, dumping the heavy responsibility of defending the city onto Pétain. French President Leclaire also officially appointed Pétain as the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern French Army on the same day.

Could Pétain turn the tide?

History proved that this marshal, deeply beloved by French officers and soldiers, failed to save Paris.

On December 15, the number of German divisions arriving near Paris exceeded sixty, and Major General Hoffmann, commanding the front lines, began deploying forces to encircle the city.

Three days later, Paris was completely surrounded by the German army.

Hoffmann did not rush to issue the order to attack; instead, he first delivered an ultimatum to Pétain.

If the French forces refused to surrender before midnight on December 20, the German army would launch its offensive in the early hours of the 21st, initially deploying one hundred thousand artillery pieces to pulverize the entirety of Paris.

Following this, Hoffmann ordered a total blockade of Paris, forbidding any citizens from fleeing.

At this juncture, within the urban area of Paris, there were at least three million civilians, approximately one million two hundred thousand French soldiers, and countless cultural relics and historical monuments bearing a millennium of French history.

On December 20, Pétain personally arrived at the German frontline headquarters to conduct final negotiations with Hoffmann.

Pétain put forth several conditions, such as requiring the German army to treat French prisoners of war humanely, ensuring the personal safety of Parisian citizens, and protecting the city's cultural heritage. After Hoffmann agreed to these requests from Pétain, the marshal signed the instrument of surrender that very afternoon on behalf of the one million two hundred thousand French troops.

In the early morning of December 21, three German divisions personally selected by Hoffmann marched into Paris.

Simultaneously, the German Emperor announced at the Potsdam Palace that the Second German Empire had defeated its arch-rival France, winning the largest war in European history.

Yet, France had not surrendered.

That very afternoon, French President Leclaire announced in Toulouse the formation of a new government, declaring that France had not been defeated and would never be defeated.

The war was far from over.

Following the capture of Paris, the German army rested for merely three days before resuming its southward advance in accordance with Ludendorff's deployment plans. Eighty German divisions, directly commanded by Hoffmann, moved westward to sweep through the Atlantic regions of France. In the east, sixty German divisions commanded by Bavarian Crown Prince Marshal Rupprecht crossed the Franco-German border and began pressing southward. A total of two hundred and forty German divisions, split into three distinct fronts, continued their assault on the French forces.

How much longer could France hold out?

On December 30, inspired by the monumental German victory, Italy committed one hundred and forty divisions, launching a comprehensive offensive along the southern front.

Although the Italian offensive still lacked punch and failed to achieve a substantive breakthrough even when outnumbering the French forces two to one, it played one crucial role: it forced France to reinforce its southern front, at a time when France had virtually no usable troops left to spare.

As the year 1917 dawned, the greatest variable remained the United States.

During the final ten days of December 1916, the United States Army once again formed the European Corps, committing nearly eight hundred thousand troops, seventy-five thousand of whom were raw recruits who had just completed two months of training. On the very first day of 1917, this massive force boarded three transport fleets.

However, the destination of the American European Corps was not France, but Britain.

The reason was simple: by this time, the German army had already seized the Atlantic regions of France, capturing all ports facing the Atlantic. In the Mediterranean theater, Marseille was the only port remaining in French hands, as Nice was already within the firing range of Italian long-range artillery. More importantly, the core strength of the British Royal Navy was concentrated entirely in home waters, with only a small flotilla consisting of eight pre-dreadnoughts left in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the United States Navy had not yet recovered its full strength, rendering both the US and Britain incapable of seizing command of the Mediterranean.

Naturally, there was an even more vital reason.

Following the defeat of France, the next inevitable target of the Second German Empire would be Britain. Since the British Royal Navy no longer held a positional advantage, the British mainland was highly susceptible to attack.

If Britain were also to fall, the American military would be forced to fight the German army in Europe without any established bridgehead.

Clearly, even if the United States itself were not defeated, it stood no chance of winning this war.

To achieve victory, what the United States needed to preserve was not France, but Britain—especially given that Paris had already been captured by the German army and the French government existed in name only. Continuing to dispatch troops to France clearly held little substantive meaning, whereas reinforcing the defense of the British mainland was infinitely more critical.

Regardless, the arrival of the American European Corps offered a glimmer of hope to the British.

One might even say that without the American military intervention, Britain would undoubtedly have surrendered within two to three months, bringing an end to this war that had engulfed the entirety of Europe.

The problem was that the entry of the United States merely postponed the timing of Britain's surrender at best.

Let us not forget that if Britain wished to continue fighting, it must first prevail in the naval theater and eliminate the threat posed by the navy of the Second German Empire. Regrettably, by 1917, even if the US Navy were added to the equation, the British Royal Navy possessed not the slightest shred of advantage.

On January 11, 1917, the American European Corps arrived in Britain.

On that same day, the battleships *Sachsen* and *Württemberg*, along with the battlecruiser *Hindenburg*, held grand commissioning ceremonies in Wilhelmshaven. In addition, eight battleships from the second batch of repairs, including the *König*, returned to the High Seas Fleet on this day.

With this, the number of capital ships in the Imperial Navy reached twenty-five, comprising sixteen battleships and nine battlecruisers.

Since three battlecruisers, including the *Moltke*, had returned to the oceanic fleet to continue commerce-raiding operations, the High Seas Fleet maintained twenty-three capital ships in active service.

This scale surpassed the combined total of the British and American navies.

Even when its scale had surpassed that of the High Seas Fleet, the British Royal Navy had failed to win a single decisive victory.

Now inferior in scale to the High Seas Fleet, could the British Royal Navy possibly turn the tables?

Lacking command of the sea, upon what foundation could Britain possibly sustain its resistance?