Chapter Sixty-Six: Marching Toward War

For the Empire, the most critical factor was not Russia or France, but Britain's position.

Although Feng Chengqian was not involved in drafting the Army’s operational plans, Tirpitz, as commander of the Imperial Navy, was privy to certain Army-related information. According to what Tirpitz had learned, neither Little Moltke nor Ludendorff, who was assisting the Crown Prince in planning operations, regarded Russia or France as worthy adversaries. In the eyes of these Army commanders, if deprived of external support, even a Russo-French alliance could not stand against the Empire. Little Moltke even believed it would take only six months to defeat both Russia and France. While Ludendorff was less optimistic, he too felt confident that France could be vanquished in half a year and Russia within two years.

The crux of the matter, therefore, was whether France and Russia could secure external aid.

The only power capable of providing such assistance was Britain, across the North Sea.

On June 30, the Imperial Ambassador to Britain, Linknauski, submitted a diplomatic note to Foreign Secretary Grey and entered into consultations with the British government as the Empire’s plenipotentiary representative.

Linknauski's mission was simple: to ascertain Britain’s stance.

To put it plainly, after war broke out between Germany and France and Russia, would Britain enter the conflict and, if so, in what manner?

Curiously, in their initial contact, Grey’s response was precisely what the Kaiser had hoped for.

According to the message relayed by Linknauski, Britain would maintain its neutrality, would not intervene in the continental conflict, nor extend assistance to France or Russia. Grey offered a most convincing rationale: Parliament would not allow the government to go to war with the German Empire for the sake of two non-allied countries.

This intelligence clearly brought a sigh of relief to the Kaiser, Little Moltke, Tirpitz, and others.

Yet, Feng Chengqian felt not the slightest joy.

In the history he knew so well, Britain too had professed neutrality before the outbreak of the Great War, only to change its stance the moment hostilities began. Indeed, it could be said that it was Britain’s diplomatic maneuvering that led the Empire to misjudge the situation and ultimately launch a war at the worst possible moment.

Regrettably, Feng Chengqian’s concerns were not heeded by the Kaiser.

On July 10, Little Moltke submitted his revised operational plan to the Kaiser, explicitly stating that, provided France had not completed its mobilization, he was absolutely confident Paris could be taken within six weeks, forcing France to surrender, after which the main force would be transferred to the Eastern Front to defeat Russia within half a year.

It was an ambitious plan, broadly in line with Marshal Schlieffen’s general strategy.

Yet, the most crucial issue remained unresolved: the German army would not march through the Netherlands, but instead would enter Belgium directly from the Ardennes, seize the fortress of Liège, occupy Brussels, then turn southward and, via a great sweeping maneuver, invade France from the north.

There were also grave problems with the force allocations. Little Moltke, for instance, still insisted on deploying forty divisions along the border with France to tie down the French army, rather than only eighteen.

Fortunately, the Kaiser possessed ample experience in war.

Reviewing Little Moltke’s plan, the Kaiser pointed out that deploying too many troops along the border would inevitably leave the main attack understrength, jeopardizing the capture of Paris as planned. As for passing through Belgium, the Kaiser raised no objection.

Clearly, in the Kaiser’s eyes, if Britain was determined to enter the war, whether the German army marched through Belgium was of little consequence.

On July 11, Emperor Joseph-Franz of Austria-Hungary telegraphed the Kaiser once more, hoping he would adopt a firmer stance regarding Serbia, and declaring that, with the Kaiser’s support, Austria-Hungary would unconditionally back any action the German Empire chose to take in this matter.

With events at this stage, could the Kaiser still remain neutral?

That evening, he convened another imperial council.

Although barely ten days had passed, the positions of the Imperial ministers had shifted dramatically.

Perhaps influenced by Foreign Secretary Grey’s reply, at this meeting there were scarcely any ministers still advocating peace; the majority now deemed war necessary.

Of course, their words were less blunt. Many argued that by punishing Serbia and waging a war in the Balkans, Russia’s ambitions could be checked.

They believed the conflict would remain confined to the Balkans, like previous limited wars in that region, and would not escalate into a continental conflagration, much less threaten the Empire’s very survival. Even in defeat, they saw little to lose.

Clearly, those who spoke lightly of war underestimated its hazards.

Feng Chengqian’s stance was unequivocal: if war could be avoided, so be it; but if it must be fought, the Empire must prepare for a world war.

Whether or not his counsel influenced the Kaiser, the ministers’ positions determined the Kaiser’s own.

On July 12, the Kaiser replied to the Austrian Emperor, assuring him that the Empire would support all reasonable demands and assist in any punitive action.

That same day, the Ninth Corps stationed on the Austro-German border began mobilizing.

With the Kaiser’s guarantee, Austria-Hungary grew more intransigent over the Sarajevo incident.

Yet even at this point, many still believed diplomacy could resolve the crisis, and that war might be averted.

At this juncture, the most active party was not Germany, Russia, or France, but Britain.

In a sense, the Sarajevo incident had little to do with Britain, at least on the surface. If Britain kept to its Foreign Secretary’s promise of neutrality, the conflict, should it arise, would not directly affect British interests.

Clearly, this was not the case.

On July 15, Grey sent a note to the ambassadors of Germany, Austria, France, Russia, and Italy, proposing an international conference to address the Sarajevo incident.

Alas, Grey acted a day too late.

Just the day before Grey’s diplomatic note, the Emperor of Austria-Hungary had approved a mobilization order submitted by Chief of Staff Conrad, placing forty Austrian divisions facing Serbia on a war footing, and promptly sanctioned Conrad’s plan to attack Serbia.

According to that plan, should Serbia reject Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum, the Austrian army would attack.

Interestingly, after Grey’s note, the Austrian Emperor delayed issuing the ultimatum, as if still clinging to a sliver of hope for peace.

This shows that the Austrian Emperor did not truly want war, merely to appear more resolute.

The problem was that Austria-Hungary’s mobilization, even if directed solely at Serbia, would inevitably worsen the situation.

On July 16, the Tsar began contemplating whether Russia needed to mobilize against Austria-Hungary.

Although the Tsar did not immediately heed the military’s advice, Austria-Hungary’s preparations to strike at Serbia would leave him no choice.

For those who cherished peace, time was running out.

The Austrian army was hardly a formidable force—whether in the quality of its officers and men, its equipment, or its institutions, it lagged far behind the German army, and even the Russian army was superior. Nevertheless, in little more than half a month, Austria could complete its mobilization; by then, even if war was not desired, it would become inevitable.

In truth, it would not take even half a month.

In this era, mobilization was tantamount to war.

After the Franco-Prussian War, strategists such as Clausewitz formulated more rigorous military doctrines, placing great emphasis on mobilization. In the decades that followed, the great powers of Europe reformed their militaries, establishing ever more sophisticated mobilization systems, with the German Empire’s the most advanced of all. This produced a single result: on the European continent, mobilization meant war. The reason was simple: two powers of comparable strength—if one completed mobilization before the other, it could easily defeat its unprepared rival. More importantly, mobilization could take months; even a localized conflict required more than ten days. Thus, when two states were hostile, the moment one began mobilizing, war could be said to have begun.

Thus, as Austria-Hungary began mobilizing, Russian generals clamored for their own mobilization.

The Tsar’s inaction was not from ignorance of Austria-Hungary’s threat, but from the recognition that Russian mobilization would inevitably trigger German mobilization, then French mobilization, and so on, in a chain reaction culminating in full-scale war.

Clearly, Russia could not wait until Austria-Hungary had completed its preparations.

In terms of timing, the Tsar had to decide before July 20; otherwise, Russia would not be ready when Austria-Hungary attacked.

In other words, by the latest, on July 20, if diplomacy had not resolved the crisis, war in Europe would break out.

In the days that followed, Foreign Secretary Grey acted with great energy.

But the Austrian Emperor presented twenty-one demands, of which Serbia agreed to eighteen, refusing only the three most critical.

On July 19, Austria-Hungary issued its ultimatum to Serbia.

Serbia was required to respond within forty-eight hours to Austria-Hungary’s punitive demands, or Austria-Hungary would be free to act as it saw fit.

To Russia, Austria-Hungary’s formal ultimatum was the signal for war.

That day, the Tsar approved a mobilization order, though modified to target only Austria-Hungary.

He also telegraphed the Kaiser, assuring him that Russia harbored no ill will toward the German Empire.

But would this allay the Kaiser’s suspicions?

Though Tsar Nicholas II was the nephew of Emperor Frederick III, such royal kinship could never outweigh the interests of states.

Clearly, the Tsar’s assurances were to no avail.